Friday, June 15, 2007

Hamastan

1. In Britain (and France), frivolous anti-Zionist SLAPP suits filed by
anti-Semites get thrown out of court.
See http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=28726
If only that were the case in Israel.


2. Furry Finkelsteins:
http://zalmi.blogspot.com/2007/06/posterboys-of-arab-boycott.html


3. Beeb Boob C:
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/122764


4. Anti-Boycott Brits:
http://www.thes.co.uk/current_edition/story.aspx?story_id=2037095


5. The Cockburn Cockroaches are rallying:
http://counterpunch.com/christison06132007.html


6. Anti-Zionist Scum of all sorts:
http://www.jewishworldreview.com/0607/tobin061307.php3
What a surprise - the Moonbrits who boycott Israel want to see Israel
destroyed:
http://haaretz.com/hasen/spages/871413.html


7. Hamastan:
June 15, 2007

Hamastan
By BARRY RUBIN
June 15, 2007; Page A16

The seizure of the Gaza Strip by Hamas opens a new period in the history
of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Middle East. A new Islamist state is
being established and it doesn't bode well for the West or regional
stability.

And yet we can hope that something will be learned from this experience.
Israel's left-leaning Ha'aretz expresses the lesson with what some would
call British understatement: "Anyone in Israel still contemplating the
question of a Palestinian partner might also need to do some rethinking.
In Gaza, at least, it seems there is nobody left for Israel to talk to."

In 2000, Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat turned down President Bill
Clinton's offer of an independent Palestinian state with its capital in
east Jerusalem and an opening offer of $23 billion in aid. Ever since then
it has been clear that there is no diplomatic solution for the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Arafat's renewal of terrorist violence only
reinforced this point.

The problem was not just Arafat, but the overall strategy of the
Fatah-dominated Palestinian movement. Since the peace process began in
1993 with the Oslo Accords, that leadership made hardly a single effort to
move Palestinian society toward peace and moderation. Fatah did have an
attractive alternative it could have offered: We will get a state, return
the refugees to live in it, develop our economy and culture and enjoy
large-scale international aid in exchange for ending the conflict.

Instead it continued to glorify violence, spread hatred of Israel and
America, and raise a new generation with a belief in eventual "total"
victory and the extinction of Israel. After Arafat died, Fatah remained
incompetent and corrupt but lacked a strong leader. Unable to obtain a
state, unwilling to make peace and uninterested in governing well, Fatah
dug its own grave. Why should anyone be surprised that Hamas replaced it?
At most, Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and American pressure to
hold fair elections only accelerated this process.

There has been another important lesson in this recent history: Most of
the Arab states and movements need the conflict to continue. After all,
what would mismanaging dictatorial regimes do without having Israel as a
scapegoat? If, for example, Syria made peace with Israel in exchange for
getting back the Golan Heights, it would be the beginning of the end for
that regime. Within weeks, its people would be demanding human rights and
free-enterprise economic reforms. The regime could not use anti-Israel and
anti-American demons as an excuse to continue the dictatorship, deprive
its people of rights and material well-being, and mobilize support. The
same applies to radical Islamist movements seeking to gain power.

So let's get this straight: There is no near-term solution to the
Arab-Israeli conflict. There is no Palestinian side with which a
compromise agreement can be negotiated. Many Arab states seek to exploit
the conflict. Others would like to make peace but are too scared, and it
is to the West's discredit that such states don't believe that it can or
will protect them.

There are several key policy conclusions to be drawn from the Hamas
triumph. First, Western and especially U.S. policy must get beyond an
obsession with solving this conflict. It is going to go on for decades.
Peace plans will go nowhere. Hamas will not be persuaded to moderate --
why should it when it expects victory at home and appeasement from Europe?
Hamas is the enemy, just as much as al Qaeda, because it is part of the
radical Islamist effort to seize control of the region, overthrow anything
even vaguely moderate, and expel any Western influence.

Second, since Palestinian politics have clearly returned to a pre-1993
status, so must Western and U.S. policy. This means no Western aid and no
diplomatic support until their leaders change policies. The Palestinian
movement can only earn financial help and political backing on the very
distant day when it accepts Israel's right to exist, stops endorsing and
using terrorism, and is serious about negotiating a real two-state
solution.

Third, it is time to support Israel proudly and fully. Israel has done
everything possible for peace, taking great risks to do so. But the idea
that evenhanded, confidence-building behavior can broker peace is
regrettably dead.

There are wider strategic implications for U.S. and Western interests in
this dramatic yet predictable development. The radical forces have gained
a major new asset that will encourage the recruitment of new cadre. Iran,
Syria and Hezbollah will grow more confident and aggressive.

We are now in the middle of the third great battle with totalitarianism in
living memory. As with the struggles against fascism and communism, this
conflict can only be won by a mobilization of Western resources and
resolve. What has happened in the Gaza Strip is a lost battle in that
process. There is not room for too many more of these defeats.

Mr. Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs
(GLORIA) Center and the author of "The Truth About Syria"
(Palgrave-Macmillan, 2007).

URL for this article:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118186922078136232.html






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